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NOTES
MUNICIPAL  BANKRUPTCY  AND  PUBLIC
PENSIONS:  DETROIT’S  ELIGIBILITY  FOR
CHAPTER  9  RELIEF  AND  LEGAL
RESTRAINTS  ON  THE  CITY’S  ACTIONS
AS  A  DEBTOR
Jackson T. Garvey*
“I’m a proponent of cities going bankrupt.  Bridgeport will show the way.
It’s the only way out.”1
–Richard M. Daley, Former Mayor of Chicago
INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2013, after decades of steady economic decline, the City of
Detroit, Michigan filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Michigan
under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2  For years, Detroit
has served as a cautionary tale for single-industry-dominated cities.  Detroit is
both the most populous U.S. city to declare bankruptcy and the most
indebted municipality to ever file for relief.3  Its exact debts have not yet
been determined, but early estimates put the number somewhere between
eighteen and twenty billion dollars.4
The case presents complex legal and political problems, but one group
of creditors has received the bulk of media attention in the city’s bankruptcy:
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A. in Economics and
Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012.  I would like to thank
Professor Anthony J. Bellia for his guidance and feedback throughout this process as well
as the Notre Dame Law Review for their edits and suggestions.
1 Tom Morganthau & John McCormick, Are Cities Obsolete?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9, 1991,
at 42.
2 Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).
3 Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency,
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pensioners.  Pension commitments to both current and future retirees
represent a sizeable portion of the city’s overall debts, and estimates by
Detroit’s state-appointed Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr and his team place
the amount of underfunded pension obligations at $3.5 billion.5  Because
ERISA pension pre-funding requirements do not apply to governmental pen-
sion plans,6 many public pension systems are paid directly out of the munici-
pality’s yearly budget instead of being pre-funded by employee earnings.7
Many cities across the country face similarly burgeoning underfunded pen-
sion debt,8 and some states (including Michigan) have passed statutory or
constitutional protection for pension benefits once they have been earned or
have vested.9  A recent estimate from a 2010 study conducted by Northwest-
ern University economists pegs the total deficit in public pension plans in the
United States at $574 billion.10  This means that pensioners and municipal
administrators across the country will be watching Detroit’s bankruptcy
closely, since any legal precedent set by the case will have enormous influ-
ence on the future of municipal bankruptcy law and the retirement out-
comes of many Americans.
This Note will seek to address the constitutional and statutory issues
raised in the early stages of Detroit’s bankruptcy.  Part I will briefly address
how Detroit reached the point where municipal bankruptcy became legally
possible and politically attractive.  It will examine population trends in the
city, changes in the character of Detroit’s major industries, and the deteriora-
tion of city services.
Part II will provide background information about the history of munici-
pal bankruptcy in America and the constitutional challenges that it has faced.
It will attempt to give a base from which to examine the major issues raised
by Detroit’s case and how they might fit into the history of municipal bank-
ruptcy and America’s system of federalism.  Specifically, it will address the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bekins11 and some of the cases
that have followed.
5 Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of City of Detroit, Michigan’s Statement of
Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 6 n.3, In re City of
Detroit, No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).
6 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2006).
7 Though a pure “pay-as-you-go” system is not legally prohibited for government enti-
ties, voluntary “best practices” accounting standards put forward by the Government
Accounting Standards Board have driven many municipalities to pre-fund at least a portion
of their pension obligations, if not 100%. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pen-
sion Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 841–42 (2009).
8 David Klepper, Political, Popular Obstacles Block Pension Changes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6,
2013, 11:40 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP894799daf3ba45eaa6d1c79154fc806a
.html?KEYWORDS=pension+crisis.
9 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24; 3 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 12.141 & n.2 (3d ed. 2001).
10 Klepper, supra note 8.
11 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
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Part III will dive into the issues raised by objectors to Detroit’s filing.
While the objectors have raised at least thirteen distinct objections to the
filing, this Note will concentrate on three.  First, an effort will be made to
demonstrate that contrary to some of the objections raised in the Detroit
case, Chapter 9 is facially constitutional.  Next, it will examine Michigan’s
authorization of Detroit’s bankruptcy petition in accordance with § 109(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code.12  It will argue that Public Act 436,13 the Michigan law
that authorizes municipal bankruptcy and sets out the procedures that must
be followed to file under Chapter 9, is constitutional and that the filing in
this case complied with both federal and state law.  It will also argue that
Chapter 9 is constitutional as applied to Detroit, and that the protections
present in Chapter 9 do more than enough to overcome any potential Tenth
Amendment issue in Detroit’s filing.14  Finally, it will argue that, due to the
Bankruptcy Code’s incorporation of state law property definitions, public sec-
tor pensions may not be reduced in Michigan by any means, including Chap-
ter 9 bankruptcy.
I. HOW DETROIT REACHED BANKRUPTCY
Detroit was once the cradle of the world’s automobile industry.  It had a
population of 1.85 million at its peak in 1952,15 built half the world’s cars in
the early 1950s,16 and experienced intense job-driven population growth for
multiple decades.17  However, the industry that spurred Detroit to become
the fourth-largest city in America18 would also prove to be the main driver of
its decay.  Shortly after the end of World War II, the auto industry started
moving toward automated production processes, reducing the need for
labor.19  Not surprisingly, this shift led to rising unemployment in Detroit, as
the number of manufacturing jobs fell by approximately 134,000 between
1947 and 1963.20
The problem only worsened when foreign automakers began to gain
market share both abroad and in America.  Between 1955 and 1980, the
“Detroit Three” (Ford, Chevrolet, and Chrysler) saw their American market
12 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–.1575 (2013).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15 Julia Vitullo-Martin, Detroit Fights Back, 5 CITY J. 55 (1995), available at http://
www.city-journal.org/html/5_3_detroit_fights.html.
16 Id.
17 Tom Bethell, Detroit’s Fate, AMERICAN, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 36.
18 Michael A. Fletcher, Detroit Goes Bankrupt, Largest Municipal Filing in U.S. History,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/detroit-
files-largest-municipal-bankruptcy-in-us-history/2013/07/18/a8db3f0e-efe6-11e2-bed3-b9b
6fe264871_story.html.
19 Kevin Boyle, The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City, 27 MICH.
HIST. REV. 109, 114 (2001).
20 Id.
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share for new cars plummet from 95% to 75%.21  Things did not improve
with time, and in 2010, the American market share held by the “Detroit
Three” had fallen to a previously unimaginable 45% combined.22  While the
troubled companies collectively saw a slight uptick in their market share
between 2010 and 2011 (to 47%) following the bankruptcies of Chrysler and
General Motors,23 there are no indications of a coming turnaround.
While the decline of the American auto industry’s impact on Detroit’s
economic fall is hard to overstate, it should not be considered the only
important factor.  Several other shifts contributed to the city’s economic col-
lapse.  Other manufacturing-based industries declined over the same period,
and between 1972 and 2007 the city saw around 80% of its manufacturing
plants and 78% of its retail establishments close their doors.24  This general
economic downturn led to a colossal contraction of Detroit’s labor market,
and the unemployment rate rose to a much higher figure than the national
average.25
The lack of job opportunities in Detroit likely led to another major
driver of its current problems: a shrinking population.  Detroit’s population
fell from 1.85 million in the 1950s to a little over 1 million in 1990.26  The
2010 census revealed that Detroit’s population had fallen again to 713,777
people, and the Census Bureau estimated that by 2012 only 701,475 people
remained.27  These figures reflect the stark reality that many of those with
the means to leave Detroit have chosen to move rather than deal with the
seemingly unstoppable contraction of jobs, population, and city services.
As a result of this economic and population contraction, Detroit has
seen the bottom fall out of its tax base.  Detroit’s collection of municipal
income tax receipts has fallen by more than $95 million since 2002 and by
over $34 million since 2008.28  The reduction is driven both by the shrinking
population base and a decline in per capita income.  Between 2008 and 2012,
the median household income in Detroit was $26,955.29  Over the same
21 Thomas H. Klier & James Rubenstein, Detroit Back from the Brink? Auto Industry Crisis
and Restructuring, 2008–11, 36 ECON. PERSP. 35, 46 (2012).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., DETROIT CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUES 19
(Apr. 2013).
25 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, Detroit’s unemployment rate in 2012
was 18.6%.  This was the highest unemployment rate among the fifty largest U.S. cities.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rates for the 50 Largest Cities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/lau/lacilg12.htm.
26 Compare Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1950, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.18
(June 15, 1998), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/
tab18.txt, with 1990 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/fast_facts/1990_new.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2012).
27 State & County QuickFacts, Detroit, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2014).
28 CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., supra note 24, at vi, 22.
29 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 27.
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period of time, an estimated 38.1% of residents were below the poverty
line.30  During that period, the similar national figures were $53,046 and
14.9%, respectively.31  Absent a significant change in the city’s economic and
demographic trends, Detroit’s tax base is unlikely to improve any time soon,
as both population and incomes shrink.
City services have been hit hard by the decline.  About 40% of the city’s
streetlights don’t work.32  Half the city’s parks have closed since 2008.33
Almost 80,000 buildings are considered blighted or have been abandoned,34
and police response times, even for emergency calls, are currently at nearly an
hour.35  This lack of services most certainly makes building Detroit’s tax base
back up a much harder task, since people with options of where to live are
unlikely to choose to live in a place where they cannot take their families to
the park or count on the police to protect them.  However, returning these
municipal services to acceptable levels undoubtedly will be expensive, and in
Detroit’s current financial situation, the city can’t afford to invest the neces-
sary funds into services and infrastructure.
Detroit’s situation is undeniably bleak, and more than six decades of
decline convinced the governor, with the City Council’s approval, to appoint
Jones Day restructuring attorney Kevyn Orr as the city’s Emergency Manager
on March 14, 2013.36  Mr. Orr, in his role as Emergency Manager, was
granted “sweeping powers” to make decisions concerning the city’s finances,
many of which “trump” the will of the city’s elected officials.37  The City
Council approved Governor Rick Snyder’s decision to appoint an emergency
manager by a close vote, and at the time of Mr. Orr’s appointment, many city
officials expressed a willingness to work with him to solve Detroit’s
problems.38  At the time of his appointment, Mr. Orr made public statements
about his desire to avoid guiding the city to file for relief.39
Mr. Orr and his team held negotiation sessions over the course of a few
weeks with certain groups of creditors of the city, at which they proposed a
plan to restructure the city’s debt consensually.40  At these meetings, the
Emergency Manager and his team presented a plan for the reorganization of
Detroit’s debts, answered questions, and invited feedback and counter-pro-
posals from each of the creditor constituencies that the Emergency Manager
30 Id.
31 State & County QuickFacts, USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2014).
32 Davey & Walsh, supra note 3.
33 Id.
34 Fletcher, supra note 18.
35 Id.
36 Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer Is Named to Rescue Detroit from Fiscal Disaster, N.Y.




40 Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of City of Detroit, supra note 5, at 52–67.
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and his team met with.41  While the meetings were ongoing, creditors of the
city filed a state court action seeking declaratory judgment of the unconstitu-
tionality of PA 436,42 the Michigan law that allows appointment of an Emer-
gency Manager and provides the procedure by which the State of Michigan
can authorize a filing for municipal bankruptcy.43  The plaintiffs in that suit
also asked for an injunction preventing the City of Detroit from filing for
bankruptcy.44  The meetings between creditors and the Emergency Manager
did not lead to a consensual restructuring of the debt by contract,45 and on
July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy.46  On the same day,
just after the bankruptcy was filed, Judge Rosemarie Aquilina, the judge in
the state court proceedings, ruled that PA 436 violated article IX, section 24
of the Michigan Constitution, that it was of no force or effect, and that Gover-
nor Snyder was not legally able to authorize a bankruptcy that threatened to
reduce the pensions of public workers.47  Judge Steven Rhodes, the bank-
41 Id.  There is disagreement between the city and Mr. Orr on one hand, and certain
creditors on the other, about the tone these meetings took and how collaborative in nature
they were.  A large number of the city’s creditors, especially certain unions, have argued
that the meetings did not constitute negotiations at all and instead were nothing but an
opportunity for the Emergency Manager to present a plan for restructuring the debt and
threaten the use of bankruptcy law to unilaterally reduce the pensions and health benefits
of their members. See, e.g., The Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and Sub-Chapter 98, City of Detroit Retirees’
Objection to the City of Detroit’s Eligibility to Obtain Relief under Chapter 9 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code at 12–14, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (claim-
ing that the meetings with union leaders were a sham that the Emergency Manager and
the City of Detroit engaged in solely to attempt to establish good faith negotiations prior to
the bankruptcy filing and establish compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B) (2012)).  A
detailed examination of whether these meetings satisfy the good faith negotiation require-
ment of § 109(c)(5)(B) is outside the scope of this Note.
42 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–.1575 (2013).
43 Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734-CZ, slip op. at 1–2 (Ingham Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 19,
2013); see also Kimberly Bennett, Michigan Judge Rules Detroit Bankruptcy Filing Unconstitu-
tional, JURIST (July 22, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/07/michigan-
judge-rules-detroit-bankruptcy-filing-unconstitutional.php (summarizing Judge Aquilina’s
ruling).
44 Webster, No. 13-734-CZ, slip op. at 1–3.
45 Known within the bankruptcy profession as a “workout.”
46 Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 2.
47 Webster, No. 13-734-CZ, slip op. at 2–3.  There is a considerable amount of contro-
versy surrounding the manner in which the bankruptcy petition was filed.  Some sources
reported that attorneys for the city, once they realized that Judge Aquilina was likely to rule
against them, asked for a five-minute recess, during which other city attorneys filed the
bankruptcy petition at the federal courthouse. See Detroit Bankruptcy on Hold, Snyder Admin.
Smacked Down by Judge for “Cheating Good People Who Work,” ECLECTABLOG (July 19, 2013),
http://www.eclectablog.com/2013/07/detroit-bankruptcy-on-hold-snyder-admin-smacked-
down-by-judge-for-cheating-good-people-who-work.html.  Others reported that the petition
was filed five minutes before the hearing in Judge Aquilina’s courtroom began, but made
no mention of a request for delay. See Paul Egan, Mich. Judge Rules Detroit Bankruptcy Uncon-
stitutional, WBIR (July 19, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.wbir.com/news/article/281141/
16/Mich-judge-rules-Detroit-bankruptcy-unconstitutional.  Because the automatic stay
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ruptcy judge assigned to Detroit’s case, subsequently ruled that questions
about eligibility and constitutionality would have to be resolved in bank-
ruptcy court rather than state court, and that the case could go forward in
spite of Judge Aquilina’s order.48  Indeed, in his ruling on eligibility, Judge
Rhodes stated that any attempt by Governor Snyder to authorize a bank-
ruptcy but shield pensions would be invalid.49  After the bankruptcy was
filed, more than 100 parties filed objections to the city’s eligibility to be a
debtor under Chapter 9.50  At least thirteen discrete objections were raised to
the city’s eligibility for bankruptcy relief.51  In his opinion on eligibility
issues, Judge Rhodes ruled that none of the eligibility objections would stop
the case from going forward.52
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
Municipal bankruptcy is a relatively new facet of American law.  The first
municipal bankruptcy statute was enacted in 1934 during the Great Depres-
sion.53  At the time it was enacted, over 1000 municipalities were estimated to
be in default on their municipal bonds.54  States are unable to unilaterally
adjust their debts or those of their municipalities due to the plain language
of the Contracts Clause.55  Even an extension by the state of the time to pay
contractual obligations is outside of a state’s power.56
comes into effect and prevents any judicial action that interferes with the bankruptcy case
immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the filing stopped Judge Aquilina
from enjoining the city from filing a petition.  She did, however, attempt to prohibit any
further action by Emergency Manager Orr or Governor Snyder to move the bankruptcy
forward. Webster, No. 13-734-CZ, slip op. at 2–3.  The last paragraph of the order is hand-
written and requires that a copy of the order be sent to President Obama. Id.
48 Matthew Dolan & Katy Stech, Detroit Wins a Round in Bankruptcy Court, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 2013, at A2.
49 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846, slip op. at 94
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2013).  To reach this conclusion, Judge Rhodes relied on In re
City of Stockton, 475 B.R. 720, 727–29 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012), for the proposition that state
law cannot reorder the creditor repayment priorities set out in the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
at 93.
50 City of Detroit’s Consolidated Reply to Objections to the Entry of an Order for
Relief at 2, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013).
51 Id. at Exhibit A, 1–11.
52 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 142–43.
53 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2014) [hereinafter COLLIER].
54 Id.
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 2 (1934).
56 COLLIER, supra note 53, ¶ 900.LH[1].  However, there is one narrow exception to
this general rule.  In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), the
Supreme Court upheld a state extension statute against a challenge based on the Contracts
Clause.  However, the Court made it clear that the holding was limited to the facts of that
case, id. at 516, and that its decision was at least in part a result of the specific market price
fluctuations at the time of the composition. Id. at 513.  Congress then responded by
amending the Bankruptcy Code to prevent states from enacting composition legislation
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Congress passed an act providing for municipal bankruptcy in 1934,57
which was modeled off of the era’s corporate and railroad bankruptcy provi-
sions.58  Congress was well aware of potential federalism-based constitutional
problems when drafting the law, and some members of Congress believed
that such a provision was outside of the federal government’s power.59
Though the legislation was written with an eye toward potential Tenth
Amendment and Contracts Clause problems, it was declared unconstitutional
in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District.60  The decision was the
result of a 5-4 split, with a strong dissent written by Justice Cardozo.61  The
majority felt that the law threatened the states’ “separate and independent
existence,”62 and that “[n]either consent nor submission by the states can
enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those which are
granted,”63 and so declared the law unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
Congress persevered, however, and in 1937 it enacted a revised version
of the Act.64  This time around, Congress had the benefit of the Ashton deci-
sion.65  The Act was recodified as Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code the
following year as part of a broader reorganization of the Code.66  It was sub-
stantially similar to its invalidated predecessor, but included increased pro-
tections of state sovereignty in several places.67
This Act, too, was challenged in the courts.  In United States v. Bekins,68
the Supreme Court upheld the Act by a vote of 6-2, with Justice Cardozo
taking no part in the opinion.69  The Bekins case did not explicitly rely on
statutory differences between the two versions to declare the law’s constitu-
tionality, and in fact the wording of certain state sovereignty protections went
unchanged between the two versions.70  Instead, the Court supported its
that would be binding on non-consenting bondholders.  Act of July 1, 1946, Pub L. No. 79-
481, § 81, 60 Stat. 409.  The stated purpose of the law was to ensure uniform bankruptcy
laws for municipalities throughout the United States. H.R. REP. No. 79-2246, at 4 (1946).
57 Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798.
58 COLLIER, supra note 53, ¶ 900.LH[2].
59 See S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 3–6 (1934).
60 298 U.S. 513 (1936), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub L. No. 75-302, 50
Stat. 653, as recognized in In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 18 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
61 Id. at 532 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 528 (majority opinion).
63 Id. at 531 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
64 Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (codified in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.).
65 Id.
66 Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-695, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
67 COLLIER, supra note 53, ¶ 900.LH[3]. Compare Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
251, § 80, 48 Stat. 798 (struck down in Ashton because of inadequate protection for states),
with Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 653, 659 (upheld in Bekins because of greater
protection for states).
68 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
69 Id. at 54.
70 See Act of May 24, 1934, § 80(k), 48 Stat. 798, 802; Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(i), 50
Stat. 653, 659 (“Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the
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position by pointing out the voluntariness of the petition,71 the fact that
under that Act, a majority of bondholders must agree to the filing and two-
thirds of all debt holders must vote for approval of the plan,72 and that “[t]he
statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge on the sovereignty of the
State.”73  The Court also pointed out that the ability to choose to allow its
municipalities to take advantage of Chapter 9 increases, rather than
decreases, the power of the states.74  The Court invoked the Tenth Amend-
ment, stating that it “protected, and did not destroy, [the states’] right to
make contracts and give consents where that action would not contravene
the provisions of the Federal Constitution.”75  It also analogized Chapter 9 to
the (then-recently enacted and upheld) Social Security Act,76 endorsing
“cooperation between the Nation and the States through the exercise of the
power of each to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both.”77
This language indicates that the Court saw the 1937 Act as respectful enough
of states’ rights to be proper within the country’s scheme of federalism.
The next major change to municipal bankruptcy law came in 1976, as a
result of the financial trouble of large cities at the time, especially New
York.78  The amendments of 1976 removed many of the barriers that had
previously prevented large cities from using Chapter 9 and granted the
debtor municipality powers that were similar to many of those held by private
corporation debtors in Chapter 11.79  Additional changes to Chapter 9 that
are not particularly relevant to Detroit’s situation were made in 1978 and
1988.80
Another set of significant changes to the Bankruptcy Code were made in
1994.  This round of changes included a tweak to the way states must author-
ize their municipalities to declare bankruptcy.  Prior to the 1994 amend-
ments, the statute required only that the municipality have “general
authorization” by a state to declare bankruptcy.81  Courts of the era often
found typical home-rule statutes or other grants of power that were not bank-
ruptcy-specific to constitute general authorization to be a debtor.82  Since
power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any municipality or any political
subdivision of or in such State in the exercise of its governmental powers, including
expenditures therefor.”).
71 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47.
72 Id. at 50.
73 Id. at 51.
74 Id. at 52.
75 Id.
76 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006).
77 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53.
78 Rachael E. Schwartz, This Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport’s Chapter 9 Filing Have
Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 116–17 (1992).
79 COLLIER, supra note 53, ¶ 900.LH[4–5].
80 Id.
81 Id. ¶ 900.LH[6].
82 See, e.g., In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (ruling
that although the statutory language of “generally authorized” was somewhat ambiguous,
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1994, eligibility for municipal bankruptcy has required, among other factors,
that the municipality be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a munici-
pality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize
such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.”83  The requirement that
states explicitly authorize access to Chapter 9 before municipalities are eligi-
ble to file gave states greater control over their municipalities and added an
extra layer of protection for state control that did not exist when Bekins was
decided.  States have exercised this authority in different ways.  While only
one state (Georgia) explicitly denies its municipalities access to Chapter 9,
many states have no statute addressing the issue and many others require
municipalities to fulfill requirements that go above and beyond those in the
Bankruptcy Code before they can file.84  The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 200585 once again amended Chapter 9 of
the Code and dealt generally with provisions concerning the automatic
stay.86
III. RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ISSUES IMPLICATED
IN DETROIT’S BANKRUPTCY
Detroit’s bankruptcy implicates an enormous number of legal issues,
both constitutional and statutory.  In preparation for a trial on the eligibility
issue alone, the City of Detroit’s brief responded to thirteen distinct objec-
tions raised by its creditors.87  To address all of the potential issues raised by
Detroit’s filing would be a monumental task.  Instead, the rest of this Note
will focus on three related areas that are likely to have an impact far beyond
Detroit’s case alone.  First, it will establish that Chapter 9 is facially constitu-
tional because it is the exercise of an explicitly enumerated power by Con-
gress and does not violate norms of federalism.  Next, it will demonstrate that
Detroit is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 9 both because Chapter 9 is
constitutional as applied to Detroit’s situation and because Detroit’s filing
complied with the Michigan Constitution and other state laws.  Finally, it will
examine the legal limitations on Detroit’s actions as a debtor while in Chap-
ter 9 and will argue that Detroit may not propose a plan that would reduce
state workers’ earned pension rights.
the Bankruptcy Code generally favors giving maximum flexibility to the debtor, so the
home-rule statute was sufficient); In re City of Wellston, 43 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1984); In re Pleasant View Util. Dist., 24 B.R. 632, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982), appeal
denied, 27 B.R. 552 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
83 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
84 Fed. Funds Info. for States, How States Address Municipal Bankruptcies, 30 STATE POL.
REP. 2, 3 (2012), available at http://www.ffis.org/sites/ffis.org/files/public/publications/
2012/V3014.pdf.
85 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
86 COLLIER, supra note 53, ¶ 900.LH[7].
87 City of Detroit’s Consolidated Reply to Objections to the Entry of an Order for
Relief, supra note 50, at Exhibit A.
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Several statutory eligibility requirements beg for scholarly attention but
will not be addressed in this Note in much detail.  Included in this is the
requirement that a debtor, prior to filing, make a good faith effort to bargain
with its creditors with the goal of avoiding bankruptcy or establish that such
negotiations are impracticable,88 the requirement that the debtor be insol-
vent,89 and the requirement that the petition be filed “in good faith.”90
There is also an interesting jurisdictional question in the case: whether the
bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
Chapter 9 and PA 436, the Michigan statute authorizing Detroit’s bankruptcy
filing.91  For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that all of these
statutory eligibility requirements have been met by Detroit and that the bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction to rule on the merits.
A. Facial Constitutionality of Chapter 11
The adjustment of debts in bankruptcy is a specifically enumerated
power of the United States Constitution.92  The objectors’ contention is that
municipal bankruptcy, as embodied in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, is
facially unconstitutional93 because it impermissibly allows the federal govern-
ment to control the decision making of a municipality by using the bank-
ruptcy system in violation of the Tenth Amendment.94
Detroit’s case is not the first time Chapter 9 has been challenged on
constitutional grounds.  In United States v. Bekins,95 the Supreme Court
upheld a precursor to the modern municipality bankruptcy statute, which
was attacked on similar Tenth Amendment grounds to those asserted in the
Detroit case.96  In Bekins, a municipal irrigation district had issued bonds to
88 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2012).
89 Id. § 109(c)(3).  In Detroit’s case, there is a fascinating question of which municipal
assets must be included when determining the city’s insolvency.  The asset that has
received the most attention in the media is the valuable art collection housed at the
Detroit Institute of Arts.  Mark Caro, Will Detroit Have to Sell Its Art to Pay Its Bills?, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-18/entertainment/chi-de
troit-culture-caro-20131018_1_detroit-institute-dia-art-institute.
90 11 U.S.C. § 921(c).
91 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 42–43.  Judge Rhodes ruled that the
bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction to decide both of these issues, because they are nec-
essary to determine an issue at the core of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction: eligibility to
be a Chapter 9 debtor. Id. at 49.
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”).
93 Objection of the Official Committee of Retirees to Eligibility of the City of Detroit,
Michigan to Be a Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code at 21–22, In re City of
Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2013) (“Chapter 9 ‘upset[s] the consti-
tutional balance between the National Government and the States.’” (quoting Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (alteration in original))).
94 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
95 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
96 Id. at 54.  Before Bekins, the previous municipal bankruptcy act, just two years
before, had been struck down by the Supreme Court for violating constitutional guaranties
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finance a capital project and found itself unable to pay the principal or the
interest on time.97  The district filed for bankruptcy, and its creditors chal-
lenged its eligibility to be a debtor, arguing that Chapter 9 violated the Tenth
Amendment.98  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Tenth Amend-
ment constrains Congress’s power to enact municipal bankruptcy relief,99
but held that where adequate protections are included in the Code to allow a
state to manage its own affairs and maintain control over its municipalities,
municipal bankruptcy is constitutional.100
The Court ruled that “[t]he bankruptcy power is competent to give
relief to [municipal] debtors . . . and, if there is any obstacle to its exer-
cise . . . it lies in the right of the State to oppose federal interference.”101  In a
municipal bankruptcy proceeding, the municipality and the state that it
serves take advantage of a federal power to gain a discharge of municipal
debts.  The exercise of that federal power is, of course, subject to the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code, but if those provisions go too far to control the
operation of the debtor, the Tenth Amendment102 or other constitutional
provisions may be violated.103  The Court in Bekins believed that adequate
protections existed in the Code in 1938 to ensure that participation in the
bankruptcy system did not violate the Tenth Amendment or any other consti-
tutional protection of the states’ right to control their municipalities.
The Court in Bekins relied primarily on the consent of the state to the
district’s filing to dismiss any potential Tenth Amendment violations.  The
of federalism because it impermissibly allowed the bankruptcy court, an arm of the federal
government, to direct the political decisions of state entities.  Ashton v. Cameron Cnty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936), superseded by statute, Act of
Aug. 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 653, as recognized in In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 18 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2012).  While the two acts were similar, some additional Tenth Amendment pro-
tections were inserted before the version of the statute at issue in Bekins was passed. See
supra notes 53–77 and accompanying text.
97 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 45–46.
98 Id. at 46.
99 Id. at 51.  This principle has been affirmed by other courts since Bekins as well. See,
e.g., In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2010) (“Bank-
ruptcy courts should review chapter 9 petitions with a jaded eye.  Principles of dual sover-
eignty, deeply embedded in the fabric of this nation and commemorated in the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, severely curtail the power of bankruptcy
courts to compel municipalities to act once a petition is approved.”).
100 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51 (“The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the
sovereignty of the State.  The State retains control of its fiscal affairs.”); see supra notes
53–77 and accompanying text.
101 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
103 If, for example, one of the Bankruptcy Code’s eligibility rules was that only munici-
palities from a state that operated as a constitutional monarchy were eligible to avail them-
selves of the Bankruptcy Code’s protections, such a provision would violate Article IV of
the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
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Court opined that “[i]t is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make
contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental
power.”104  It viewed municipal bankruptcy as a cooperative venture between
the state and the federal government to accomplish an objective that could
be achieved by neither one acting alone.105  The Court also made the com-
mon-sense point that the ability of the state to take advantage of the federal
bankruptcy power through Chapter 9 increases, rather than impinges upon,
state power, and thus striking it down on Tenth Amendment grounds would
not make sense.106  The Court’s rationale relies both on the state’s consent
to its municipality declaring bankruptcy and on the protections built into the
Code itself.  Without these protections, Chapter 9 runs the risk of shifting the
power to control municipalities from the states to the federal government,
potentially violating the Tenth Amendment and structural principles of
federalism.
Those protections are therefore crucially important to the constitutional
limitations of any Chapter 9 case and indeed to the constitutionality of Chap-
ter 9 itself.  Whether Chapter 9 is constitutional, therefore, essentially comes
down to the question of whether these protections are strong enough to over-
come any potential Tenth Amendment issue.  The objectors argue that
Bekins has been effectively overruled by two lines of Supreme Court cases that
have some overlap: those that rule that a policy impermissibly violates princi-
ples of federalism when citizens are unable to effectively keep their govern-
ments accountable due to confusion about whether the state or federal
government is responsible for a given policy107 and those that hold the fed-
eral government cannot commandeer state officials or legislators to adminis-
ter or enact a federal regulatory program.108
104 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51–52.
105 See id. at 53.  States are prevented from adjusting the debts of their municipalities
unilaterally by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . .”).  The federal government, of course, cannot unilaterally adjust the debts of
municipalities without violating the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Energy
Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14 (1983) (“In almost
every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its contractual obligations when it
enters financial or other markets.” (citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–28
(1977); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S.
432 (1877))).
106 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (“The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign
powers.”).
107 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“An individual has a
direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the
National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that
is concrete, particular, and redressable.”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ur citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”).
108 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress
may not commandeer state officials to enforce federal laws); New York v. United States,
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The objectors’ arguments are effectively undermined by several princi-
ples.  First, the Supreme Court does not overrule on-point case law by impli-
cation.109  Even if this fundamental principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence does not totally foreclose the argument being made by the
objectors, the contention that Bekins has been overruled by implication, how-
ever, or that it violates principles of federalism in a way that makes the entire
chapter unconstitutional, fails on the merits.
The Supreme Court has been clear that where state officials freely elect
to participate in a federal program, there is no confusion of accountabil-
ity.110  In the Chapter 9 context, the requirement of specific authorization
for bankruptcy and the ability of the state to retain control over its municipal-
ities, even while that municipality is in bankruptcy, remove any fear that the
citizens of a state will not be able to hold their government accountable.111
Since Bekins, the state authorization provision has been tweaked to increase
its protection for state sovereignty: since 1994, the Code has required specific
authorization, rather than general authorization, from a state before a
municipality of that state can declare bankruptcy.112  This means state gov-
ernments must make an explicit, conscious choice to allow their municipali-
ties to file.  The language of 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) allows the state to either
pass a statute that authorizes all of its municipalities to declare bankruptcy at
will, set certain conditions above and beyond those in the Bankruptcy Code
that must be satisfied for a municipality to qualify, or create a procedure by
which state officials can approve debtors to file on a case-by-case basis.113
Simple home-rule statutes or similar delegating legislation are not sufficient
to authorize a municipality to declare bankruptcy.114  This gives states incred-
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.”).
109 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest
on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [courts] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme Court] the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.”).
110 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (reasoning that where “a State has a legitimate choice whether to” take advantage
of the federal scheme or forego participation, “state officials can fairly be held politically
accountable for choosing to accept or refuse the federal offer”).
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exer-
cise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .”).
112 Compare id. § 109(c)(2) (explaining that a municipal debtor must be “specifically
authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter
by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter”), with In re City of Bridgeport,
128 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (ruling that although the statutory language of
“generally authorized” was somewhat ambiguous, the Bankruptcy Code generally favors
giving maximum flexibility to the debtor, so the home-rule statute was sufficient).
113 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
114 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAY-14 8:08
2014] municipal  bankruptcy  and  public  pensions 2313
ible leeway and control over when and in what circumstances their munici-
palities can file for relief.  It is hard to imagine that such a degree of control
over the process by the state would create any doubt that the state is account-
able for the choice to allow its municipalities to declare bankruptcy.  It cer-
tainly imparts greater control to states than did the legislation at issue in
Bekins, meaning that, at least where authorization is concerned, the current
Code is even less prone to Tenth Amendment problems than the version
upheld in 1938.
It is true that the Court has, since Bekins, significantly weakened one of
the principles it relied upon in that case: that the consent of a state can
remove federalism-based constitutional problems.115  While these cases gen-
erally arise in the Commerce Clause context, they do signal a possible shift in
the way the Court views the nature of the relationship between the federal
government and the states.  However, the protections for state sovereignty in
the Bankruptcy Code have only increased since Bekins was decided and do
more than enough to overcome the changes in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence that the objectors lean on in their attempt to undermine Bekins.
Chief among these protections is § 903 of the Code.116  This provision
ensures that, even when a municipality is in Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the state
retains control over its political and operational decisions.117  Section 903’s
protection has been fleshed out in the case law since Bekins, and has been
interpreted as having real teeth.  In the largest Chapter 9 case other than that
of Detroit, a bankruptcy court in the Ninth Circuit affirmed that § 904 “is so
comprehensive . . . [that] a federal court can use no tool in its toolkit . . . to
interfere with a municipality regarding political or governmental powers.”118
Section 903 works in tandem with § 904, which limits the jurisdiction and
powers of the bankruptcy court and prevents it from interfering with, among
other things, “any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor.”119
Looking at these two provisions in tandem, the court in In re Stockton went on
115 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Fidelity to principles of feder-
alism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
181–82 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state govern-
ments for the protection of individuals. . . . Where Congress exceeds its authority relative
to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by
the ‘consent’ of state officials.”).
116 11 U.S.C. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to
control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the
political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .”).
117 Id.
118 In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 20 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 904).
119 11 U.S.C. § 904 (“Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor con-
sents or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case
or otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the
debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoy-
ment of any income-producing property.”); In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 17 (quoting
§ 904).
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to specify, with force, that because the language of § 904 is so broad, “no
inherent authority power, no implied equitable power, no Bankruptcy Code
§ 105 power, no writ, no stay, no order” nor any other power the bankruptcy
court possesses allows it to direct the policy or management choices of a
debtor in Chapter 9.120  Such broad, sweeping statutory language, and the
accordingly broad language of the court in Stockton interpreting the provi-
sion, certainly constrains the bankruptcy court more narrowly than the Tenth
Amendment alone does.  This means that in any situation where a Tenth
Amendment issue is implicated, § 903 and 904’s limitations on the bank-
ruptcy court’s control of a municipality will step in and require remedy of the
objectionable judicial action before any constitutional rights are violated.121
Additionally, in Chapter 9, the debtor municipality retains the exclusive
right to propose a plan throughout the whole of the proceeding.122  This is
markedly different from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy context, where the
debtor enjoys a period of exclusivity, but if no plan is confirmed during that
time, creditors have the opportunity to propose an alternative plan.123  This
exclusivity means that even in Chapter 9, municipal (and therefore state-con-
trolled) officials are the ones who direct the bankruptcy: since only a plan
that is proposed can be confirmed, municipal officials have the power to
ensure that state law is complied with when they design the plan.  This exclu-
sivity is especially important when considered in conjunction with the § 903
protections ensuring that, even in bankruptcy, municipal officials will have to
continue to comply with state law.124  These two provisions of the Code, if
given their natural meaning, require that even in bankruptcy state officials
cannot propose a plan that violates state law.125  This interpretation protects
states’ self-governance and respects state law while still allowing states to take
advantage of a federally offered program that gives them greater power to
adjust the debts of ailing municipalities.
Finally, if the debtor files a plan that complies with the provisions of
Chapter 9, the court has no choice but to confirm it.126  Section 943 of the
Code places certain restrictions on what a plan must contain (for example, it
120 See In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 17, 20.
121 Even if § 903’s limitation is parallel with, rather than greater than, that of the Tenth
Amendment, the constitutional avoidance doctrine of interpretation requires that any
interpreting court decide the issue on statutory grounds, rather than constitutional ones.
Therefore, the existence of § 903 ensures that any federalism issue can be resolved without
making broad, sweeping rulings that would unravel an important insolvency tool for strug-
gling municipalities.
122 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s
debts.” (emphasis added)).
123 Id. § 1121(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may
file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”).
124 See id. § 903; supra notes 110–14.
125 For a more detailed discussion on this topic in Detroit’s case, see infra Section III.C.
126 “The court shall confirm the plan if . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 943(b) (emphasis added)
(listing the provisions with which the debtor’s plan must comply, but stating that if those
conditions are met, the plan must be approved).
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cannot require the debtor municipality to break any laws in implementing
the plan and the debtor must be eligible under the Code’s definition of who
may be a debtor), but if the plan complies with all of § 943(b)’s require-
ments, the bankruptcy judge must approve it.127  This leaves the judge with
two options: (1) approve the plan of the debtor as written, or (2) deny confir-
mation of the plan because the plan does not comply with the requirements
of § 943(b).  Because the debtor has exclusivity throughout the entire case,
this scheme means that the bankruptcy judge has only limited ability to con-
trol the debtor in bankruptcy: the judge cannot bind the municipality to any
terms it did not propose itself and has very limited ability to even shape the
plan the debtor chooses to put forward.
These limitations, taken together, create a system in which states remain
in control of their municipalities throughout the entire bankruptcy process.
Rather than impermissibly constraining state power, Chapter 9 actually
increases it by allowing the states to elect into eligibility for relief.  Because of
the depth and breadth of the protections in the Code for states’ control of
the process, no municipality can be forced by the federal government to
enter into bankruptcy or be bound to terms as the result of a bankruptcy
filing that it did not itself propose.  Were these protections removed, there
would be serious questions about whether Chapter 9 could be permitted
under the Constitution, but as it stands, Chapter 9 is at a minimum facially
constitutional.
In declaring Chapter 9 facially constitutional, the Michigan bankruptcy
court’s reasoning followed similar logic to that put forward by this Note.128
Judge Rhodes’s opinion first stated that Bekins is still good law and controls
the facial constitutionality of Chapter 9.129  It then identified that New
York130 and Printz131 both upheld sections of federal statutes that allowed
states to consent to participation in federal programs, while striking down
those that did not allow the states a meaningful choice.132  The eligibility
opinion can be summarized to stand for the propositions that Tenth Amend-
ment problems are avoided where states can freely choose whether or not to
participate in a federal program that is being executed under an enumerated
power of Congress and that municipal bankruptcy presents the states with
this sort of a constitutionally permissible choice.133
127 Id.
128 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 59–70.
129 Id. at 59–61.
130 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
131 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
132 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 66–69.
133 Id. at 69–70.
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B. Detroit’s Eligiblity to File for Bankruptcy
As recently as 2010, Michigan was resistant to authorize bankruptcy for
its municipalities at all.134  Because eligibility to be a Chapter 9 debtor
requires specific state authorization, until the Michigan legislature passed
legislation that authorized municipal filings, it was impossible for any Michi-
gan municipality to access the bankruptcy system.135  In 2012 the Michigan
legislature passed PA 436, known as the Local Financial Stability and Choice
Act,136 which provided a path to municipal bankruptcy in Michigan.137  The
statute allows the governor, upon findings of probable financial stress when
certain procedural requirements are met,138 to declare a state of “financial
emergency.”139  Upon fulfilling other procedural requirements, the gover-
nor may appoint an Emergency Manager, who “shall act for and in the place
and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer
of the local government.”140  Detroit declared the requisite financial emer-
gency, and Kevyn Orr was appointed as Emergency Manager on March 13,
2013.141
The Act further provides that if the local government approves a resolu-
tion declaring a “financial emergency” and the governor’s approval is
secured in writing, the municipality may proceed as a debtor under Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code.142  The statute authorizes the governor to “place
contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under chapter
9.”143  On July 18, 2013, Governor Richard D. Snyder of Michigan sent a
letter to Emergency Manager Orr and State Treasurer Andrew Dillon explic-
itly authorizing the Chapter 9 filing and “choosing not to impose
any . . . contingencies” on the filing at that time.144  The letter also stated
that “[f]ederal law already contains the most important contingency—a
requirement that the plan be legally executable.”145  Detroit filed bankruptcy
later the same day.146
Governor Snyder’s authorization was challenged in Michigan state court
on the theory that the Act was unconstitutional because it allowed a munici-
pality to enter bankruptcy where pensions might be reduced, in violation of
134 Monica Davey, Michigan Town Is Left Pleading for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/us/28city.html.
135 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012); see supra notes 81–84, 111–14 and accompanying text.
136 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–.1575 (2013).
137 Id.
138 Id. §§ 141.1544, 141.1546.
139 Id.
140 Id. § 141.1549(2).
141 See Davey, supra note 36.
142 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1566(1).
143 Id. § 141.1566(2).
144 Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 2, at Exhibit A.
145 Id. at Exhibit A (citing 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4)).
146 See id. at 1–3.
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article IX, section 24147 of the Michigan Constitution.148  Judge Aquilina,
who heard the case, agreed with the objectors and declared that  “PA 436
[was] unconstitutional . . . to the extent that it” allowed Governor Snyder “to
authorize” a bankruptcy that “threaten[ed]” vested pension obligations.149
The rest of this Section will attempt to prove that Judge Aquilina’s ruling was
incorrect.
The objectors contend that the pension clause of the Michigan Constitu-
tion means that any approval of bankruptcy by the governor that does not
explicitly disallow the reduction of public pensions is outside of the gover-
nor’s authority as an agent of the state and therefore void.150  Similar argu-
ments have been made in Michigan in reference to the Michigan contracts
clause.151  The logic is similar in both the contracts clause and pension
clause contexts: a provision of the state constitution arguably prohibits cer-
tain debts from being diminished in bankruptcy, so authorization of a bank-
ruptcy that would allow reduction of those obligations violates the state
constitution.
In the contracts clause context, these arguments have been rejected by
the Michigan Supreme Court.  In 1990, the court ruled that the contracts
clause is “not absolute” and must be “accommodated to the inherent police
power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interest of its people.’”152  That
challenge did not come in the bankruptcy context, but involved a challenge
to a law that dealt with coordination of workers’ compensation benefits.153
Many state constitutions include a contracts clause, but most allow municipal
bankruptcy.154  If state contracts clauses categorically made any declaration
147 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan
and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obli-
gation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”).
148 Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734-CZ, slip op. at 1 (Ingham Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 19,
2013).
149 Id. at 1–2 (“PA 436 is unconstitutional and in violation of Article IX Section 24 of
the Michigan Constitution to the extent that it permits the Governor to authorize an emer-
gency manager to proceed under Chapter 9 in any manner which threatens to diminish or
impair accrued pension benefits; and PA 436 is to that extent of no force or effect . . . .”).
150 Objection of the Official Committee of Retirees to Eligibility of the City of Detroit,
Michigan to be a Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 93, ¶ 57, at
28 (“[T]o the extent that PA 436 does not protect pension benefits from impairment in
bankruptcy, it violates the Michigan Constitution.”).
151 See Romein v. Gen. Motors Corp., 462 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. 1990), aff’d, 503 U.S. 181
(1992).  Michigan’s contracts clause reads: “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law
impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted.” MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
152 Romein, 462 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983)).
153 Id. at 559.
154 See Fed. Funds Info. for States, supra note 84, at 3 (calculating that twenty-eight
states either provide full authorization for municipal bankruptcies or allow municipal
bankruptcies with conditions).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-MAY-14 8:08
2318 notre dame law review [vol. 89:5
of bankruptcy unconstitutional, municipal bankruptcy would not be possible
in any state with a contracts clause.155
Fortunately for ailing municipalities, this is not the case.  Both the
United States Contracts Clause and state contracts clauses prohibit only the
states from impairing contracts, not the United States or its courts.156  It is by
the bankruptcy power enumerated in the United States Constitution, not by
the police power of the states, that debts can be reduced, even if those debts
are contracted for.157  As stated in In re Sanitary & Improvement District, No. 7,
[T]he Bankruptcy Code . . . permits the federal courts through confirmation
of a Chapter 9 plan to impair contract rights . . . and . . . such impairment is
not a violation by the state or the municipality of [the United States Con-
tracts Clause] which prohibits a state from impairing such contract rights.158
Because the Michigan contracts clause has been determined by the Michigan
Supreme Court to have the same meaning as the United States Contracts
Clause,159 it follows that the two clauses would impose the same limitations
on a debtor municipality seeking bankruptcy relief, and the Michigan con-
tracts clause is therefore no bar to municipal bankruptcy.  Indeed if the
Michigan Constitution attempted to constrain an enumerated power of the
United States Constitution, such a clause would be preempted in any case.
Michigan’s Attorney General filed a brief in the Detroit case opining that the
state contracts clause steps aside “as a matter of state law,” not due to any
federal preemption.160
The question remains, however, whether the Michigan pension clause is
like the contracts clause in that it must bow to the general police power of
the state or whether it enjoys a higher level of protection and retains its
potency even in bankruptcy.  Certainly, not all state constitutional rights go
155 Neither, for that matter, would individual or corporate bankruptcy be possible in
any state with a contracts clause, since those cases involve the impairment of contracts just
as much as does municipal bankruptcy.
156 This is evident from the language of the clauses themselves.  For example, Michi-
gan’s contracts clause says that no law impairing contracts “shall be enacted.” MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 10.  Of course, its presence in the Michigan Constitution means that it can
be read instead as “shall be enacted [by the State of Michigan].”  The United States Consti-
tution is much more explicit about limiting only the states.  “No State shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
158 98 B.R. 970, 973 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
159 See Fun ‘N Sun RV, Inc. v. Michigan (In re Certified Question), 527 N.W.2d 468,
473–74 (Mich. 1994) (noting that the language between the two is very similar and citing
federal case law to interpret the state clause).
160 Attorney General Bill Schuette’s Statement Regarding the Michigan Constitution
and the Bankruptcy of the City of Detroit at 13, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (“[T]he subversion of a state constitution’s contracts clause does
not come about as a result of bankruptcy law or the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution; a contracts clause steps aside as a matter of state law.”).  Indeed, when ruling
on the eligibility of Detroit to be a debtor, Judge Rhodes went so far as to term objections
based on the U.S. Contracts Clause “frivolous.”  Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note
49, at 52.
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out the window the moment a municipality declares bankruptcy.  A Michigan
municipality could not propose a plan, for example, that pays people of dif-
ferent races different percentages of their debts161 or takes property without
just compensation.162  No court has yet held, and it is unlikely that any
would, that such protections step aside of their own volition to the needs of
the state and its police power.
Whether the Michigan pension clause prevents pensions from being
reduced in bankruptcy has not yet been resolved by Michigan’s courts.  The
clause itself was passed as part of the Michigan Constitution of 1963.163  That
Constitution is still in effect in Michigan today.164  The introduction of this
constitutional provision followed a controversial judicial decision that
declared that pensions, rather than being contractually vested rights, were
“terminable at the will of a municipality.”165  The language of the pension
clause clearly overrules this judicial decree and extends the protections of
contract to pensions.166  The question remains, however, whether the pen-
sion clause goes further than sweeping pensions into the protection of the
contracts clause and instead grants them a greater level of protection.  Deter-
mining the exact scope of the pension clause requires some careful statutory
interpretation.
One of the best indications of the meaning of a statute is its plain lan-
guage.  As articulated by the Supreme Court, “a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”167  Where a statute’s
plain language could indicate multiple meanings, the progression of inter-
pretive methods is “the language itself, the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”168
Additionally, it has always been the case in the interpretation of American
161 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Michigan’s equal protection provision).
162 Id. art. X, § 2 (Michigan’s takings clause).
163 Patrick J. Wright & Thomas A. Shull, Constitutional Pension Reform, 50 Years On,
MICH. CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (June 6, 2012), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential
.com/17042.
164 A Brief Michigan Constitutional History, CRC SPECIAL REP.: MICH. CONST. ISSUES (Citi-
zens Research Council of Mich.), Feb. 2010, at 1, 3–4, available at http://www.crcmich
.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2010/rpt36002.pdf.
165 Brown v. City of Highland Park, 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. 1948)  (“[A] pension
granted by public authorities is not a contractual obligation, that the pensioner has no
vested right, and that a pension is terminable at the will of a municipality, at least while
acting within reasonable limits.”), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in In re
Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38, 806 N.W.2d 683
(Mich. 2011).
166 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension . . . shall
be a contractual obligation . . . .” (emphasis added)).
167 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
168 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (citing Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139
(1991)).
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constitutions that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in [a] constitu-
tion is intended to be without effect.”169
Applying these principles to the pension clause suggests that it goes fur-
ther to protect pensions than simply making them contractual obligations.  If
the clause had only intended to bring pensions within the protection of the
contracts clause, it could have simply read: “The accrued financial benefits of
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivi-
sions shall be a contractual obligation thereof . . . .”170  However, that is not
where the clause ends; it goes on to conclude: “which shall not be diminished
or impaired thereby.”171  This additional language must add something to
the meaning of the clause in order to avoid reading it out of the Michigan
Constitution completely, in violation of the principles put forward by Marbury
and Koontz.
To determine the correct interpretation of this additional language, we
must first look to its plain meaning.  The simplest and most obvious interpre-
tation would be that the government of Michigan can take no action to
“diminish[ ]” the pensions of its public sector workers whatsoever.  It does
not state any caveats or exceptions, or that this protection must bow to the
police power of the state.  Of course, the contracts clause is written in simi-
larly absolute language, and the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted that
protection as being limited by the police power of the state in the face of a
financial emergency.172  However, to interpret the clause as simply making
pension obligations contractual is to read out its last six words.  Since there is
a reasonable interpretation of the clause that avoids this outcome, a reasona-
ble interpretation of the clause that gives legal effect to all its language
should be given great weight by the courts.
That interpretation, of course, is that the clause means just what it says:
the State of Michigan cannot reduce pension obligations, whether or not in a
state of financial emergency.  This interpretation has several benefits.  First, it
avoids reading constitutional language out of the document.  It also would
make the clause function exactly how a layperson reading it would expect a
clause with no caveats or exceptions to function.  And it is a simple, bright-
line interpretation that would be easy to administer judicially.
Perhaps even more convincingly, it would give the clause the effect that
those who enacted it likely wanted it to have.  The people of Michigan
thought it so repugnant that pension obligations, once promised, would not
be fulfilled that they wrote it into their Constitution that their government could
169 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); see also People v. Perkins,
703 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 2005) (citing Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 645 N.W.2d 34,
39 (Mich. 2002)) (requiring Michigan courts to interpret constitutions so that each word
has meaning); Koontz, 645 N.W.2d at 39 (“Courts must give effect to every word, phrase,
and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the
statute surplusage or nugatory.”).
170 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
171 Id.
172 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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not take any action that would threaten the full satisfaction of those obliga-
tions.  Such a desired result could have simply been achieved by passing a
statute.  Though the pension clause was inserted as a part of a broad set of
changes to the document rather than spurring its own one-off amend-
ment,173 its inclusion in the 1963 Constitution demonstrates that the people
of Michigan believed protection for public pensions was important enough
to merit the highest protection available under state law.174
While the decision to provide such a high level of protection for public
pensions may have been ill-advised given the current state of Detroit’s
finances, there are compelling reasons to make the pension obligations of
state workers untouchable.  Public workers generally receive less in salary and
wages than those with similar levels of education in the private sector.175  In
exchange for receiving lower pay up front, these public sector employees
generally have more lucrative pension plans than their private counter-
parts.176  If viewed this way, the pensions of public workers can be seen as
deferred compensation for services performed during those employees’
working years.  The people of Michigan could have seen that public sector
employees are therefore especially vulnerable to a reduction of pension ben-
efits and moved to give them a higher degree of protection than is provided
by the contracts clause.
173 See supra notes 163–66.  A constitutional amendment outside the larger constitu-
tional convention, in response to the decision in Brown, would perhaps have provided
more compelling evidence of the complete inviolability of public pensions by the state by
demonstrating an incredible level of voter outrage.  The lack of such an amendment, how-
ever, does not demonstrate that the only operation of the pension clause is to provide
pensions the protection of the contracts clause.
174 In its recent opinion, the bankruptcy court came to the opposite conclusion.  The
opinion by Judge Rhodes states that “[f]or Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty pur-
poses, nothing distinguishes pension debt in a municipal bankruptcy case from any other
debt.”  Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 74.  Judge Rhodes came to this
conclusion by looking at the legislative history of the amendment and Michigan cases that
have interpreted it and emphasizing the number of times that pension obligations are
referred to as contractual. Id. at 75–80.  He seems to be of the opinion that if the obliga-
tions were meant to be afforded greater protection than ordinary contracts, they would not
be referred to as “contractual” at all. See id.  The opinion did not address the argument
put forward in this Note—namely, that while the obligations are clearly contractual under
the state constitution, they are also afforded greater protection by the additional language
at the end of the state pension clause.  The Rhodes opinion, however, does acknowledge
that Michigan has the power to define property rights in a way that would shield those
rights from reduction under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 79–80.  It is the suggestion of this
Note that Michigan has done so in the case of municipal pension debt.
175 Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated Public Employee: The Evidence,
EPI BRIEFING PAPER (Econ. Pol’y Inst.), Sept. 15, 2010, at 5, available at http://www.epi
.org/files/page/-/pdf/bp276.pdf.
176 Id. at 7.  While the percentage of total compensation that comes through a defined
benefit plan ranged from 0.9% to 2.2% for private sector employees depending on the size
of the employer, 7.2% of all compensation received by private sector employees came in
the form of defined benefit plans.
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This interpretation, however, would mean that the pension clause and
the contracts clause are similar in at least one important respect: neither pre-
vents the adjustment of debts under the federal bankruptcy power.  The
rationale is the same in each case: the reduction of debts is being effectuated
by a federal court acting under an enumerated power of the Constitution.177
This interpretation is even clearer in the pension clause context than it was
when examining the Michigan contracts clause.178  By its own terms, the pen-
sion clause limits only the state’s ability to adjust pensions.179  Of course,
because these clauses appear in the Michigan Constitution, they are unable
to reduce the power of the federal government no matter how they are
worded.
Having concluded that the pension clause precludes any action whatso-
ever by Michigan to reduce the pensions of its employees, it must then be
asked whether the authorization of Detroit’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy had the
effect of “diminish[ing] or impair[ing]” any such pensions.180  Quite simply,
the answer is no.  Admittedly, the approval of a Chapter 9 filing is a step on
the way to the impairment of pensions in bankruptcy.  It is even a crucial
step, given the specific authorization requirement of § 109(c)(2).181  How-
ever, immediately upon the authorization of bankruptcy, no pensions are
impaired.182  All obligations are left in place upon the filing of a bankruptcy
case and a number of procedural steps must be taken before any impairment
can take place.183
If the bankruptcy is authorized and filed, there is no guarantee that pen-
sions will be impacted.  It could later be adjudged that the debtor was not
eligible to file under § 109,184 the debtor could choose to file a plan which
does not impair the pensions, or the debtor could choose to voluntarily dis-
miss the case.  The mere authorization of the filing will not diminish or
impair the pensions.
177 See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
179 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan
and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obli-
gation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” (emphasis added)).
The “thereby” at the end of the statute references the State of Michigan (whose pension
plans they are), and so constrains action only by the State of Michigan.
180 Id.
181 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (“[A municipal debtor must be] specifically author-
ized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by
State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to author-
ize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.”).
182 The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362, prevents any suit to collect on a debt owed by
the debtor during the term of the bankruptcy case, but such delay in an enforcement
action can hardly be said to diminish or impair a pension obligation, especially if obliga-
tions continue to be paid during the course of the case.
183 For example, the debtor must get a disclosure statement approved, FED. R. BANKR.
P. 3016(b), file a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1321, and have it confirmed, id. § 1325.
184 11 U.S.C. § 109.
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In fact, even if the debtor does not intend to impair pensions, there are
good reasons that it might want to authorize and file a bankruptcy.  A debtor
may intend to propose a plan that complies with the requirements of
§ 943185 and discharges some of its debts but does not alter its pension obli-
gations.  The debtor may not, at the time of the filing, know if it would like to
reduce its pension obligations in bankruptcy or not, but it may be looking to
benefit from the automatic stay,186 which stops all litigation and attempts to
collect against the debtor.  The filing, and the stay that comes with it, would
allow the debtor some breathing room to assess its situation without having
to focus on litigation other than the bankruptcy and determine how best to
get out of bankruptcy.
C. Whether Michigan’s Public Pensions May Be Reduced in Bankruptcy
  Some commentators have argued that, in general, pension obligations are
unsecured debt, which is generally paid at the lowest percentage in a bank-
ruptcy case.187  Judge Steven Rhodes, the bankruptcy judge assigned to
Detroit’s case, has expressed similar opinions, and stated as such in his ruling
on eligibility.188  Kevyn Orr, the Emergency Manager for the city, has
espoused the opinion that once the city files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy
Code preempts the pension clause and allows the reduction of pension
benefits.189
In bankruptcy, state officials (and, by extension, municipal officials),
must continue to act in accordance with state law.190  The Code itself explic-
itly states that the declaration of bankruptcy does not limit the state’s ability
185 Id. § 943.  The biggest obstacle to such a plan would probably be the absolute prior-
ity rule, laid out at id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).  It is somewhat unclear whether, under the inter-
pretation of the pension clause suggested by this Note, the absolute priority rule would be
violated by paying pensioners in full while paying other creditors cents on the dollar.  How-
ever, such a discussion is outside the scope of this Note.
186 11 U.S.C. § 362.
187 Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use
Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 402 (2011) (“[A] chap-
ter 9 debtor’s postpetition obligations to its retirees arising out of prepetition contractual
(or impliedly contractual) relationships arguably are entitled to nothing more than gen-
eral unsecured nonpriority status and may be impaired in a plan of adjustment.”).  In a
Chapter 11 case, equity holders would be paid a lower percentage, but because municipali-
ties have no stockholders, equity is irrelevant in the Chapter 9 context.
188 Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 49, at 74 (“For Tenth Amendment and
state sovereignty purposes, nothing distinguishes pension debt in a municipal bankruptcy
case from any other debt.”); see Joseph Lichterman, Protecting Detroit Pensions May Violate
Bankruptcy Code—Judge, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2013/10/21/usa-detroit-bankruptcy-idUSL1N0IB1HY20131021.
189 Nathan Bomey, How a Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Could Affect Detroit Pensions, Health Care,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 21, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130621/NEWS01/
306200070/.
190 “Indeed, absent a specific provision in chapter 9 to the contrary, a municipality is
required to continue to comply with state law during a chapter 9 case.” COLLIER, supra
note 53, ¶ 903.02.
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to control the actions of its agents and employees.191  Municipalities are
“political subdivisions of states from which they derive all of their rights and
powers” and “Chapter 9 does not disturb that arrangement, that is, it does
not give a city rights and powers independent of the state,” meaning that if a
state could not take an action without violating state law, a municipality may
not take that action in bankruptcy.192
If the pension clause is not preempted by the Code, Mr. Orr and his
team may not propose a plan that reduces pension benefits.  Emergency
Managers qualify as “public officer[s]” of Michigan,193 and as a result, “have
and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law.”194
Under this Note’s suggested interpretation of the pension clause, it is against
Michigan law for a public officer to take any action that would reduce or
impair vested public pensions, even in the case of financial emergency.195
Any action taken in violation of the Michigan Constitution by a public offi-
cial, even the governor, is “null and void.”196  As a result, it follows that any
action by a state official to reduce or impair pension obligations is null and
void.
Though Governor Snyder did not place any contingencies on the fil-
ing,197 this fact does not limit the operation of state law on Detroit during
the bankruptcy process.  PA 436 suggests in at least three places that the
Michigan legislature was not attempting to empower the Emergency Man-
ager to reduce pension obligations outside of the bankruptcy context.198  It
191 11 U.S.C. § 903 (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to
control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the
political or governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such
exercise, but—(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition;
and (2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not con-
sent to such composition.”).
192 In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 692 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
193 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(9)(b) (2013).
194 Sittler v. Bd. of Control of Mich. Coll. of Mining & Tech., 53 N.W.2d 681, 684
(Mich. 1952) (citations omitted).
195 See Musselman v. Governor, 533 N.W.2d 237, 239–40, 243 (Mich. 1995) (“[P]ension
obligations differ from nearly every other type of government spending insofar as they
simply cannot be reduced or cut . . . . Michigan governmental units do not have the option
. . . of not paying retirement benefits.”), aff’d on reh’g, 545 N.W.2d 346 (Mich. 1996).
196 Dullam v. Willson, 19 N.W. 112, 120 (Mich. 1884).
197 See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
198 First, PA 436 section 11 requires that the Emergency Manager “shall provide” for
the “timely deposit of required payments to the pension fund” in which the local govern-
ment participates. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1551(1)(d). Section 13 of the statute allows
the Emergency Manager to reduce or eliminate the salaries of top officials, including the
chief administrative officer of the municipality, but “does not authorize the impairment of
vested pension benefits.” Id. § 141.1553. Finally, in section 12(m)(ii), an Emergency Man-
ager is authorized to supplant a local pension board, but it is required that in that role the
Emergency Manager “fully comply with . . . section 24 of Article IX of the state constitu-
tion.” Id. § 141.1552(m)(ii).
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follows that if the pension clause is not preempted by the Bankruptcy Code,
and the statute did not give the Emergency Manager the power to adjust
pensions, they may not be adjusted in bankruptcy.
It must be determined, then, whether the pension clause is preempted
by the Bankruptcy Code.  It is the position of this Note that it is not.  In Perez
v. Campbell,199 the Supreme Court determined whether a state statute was
preempted by using a two-part test.  First, the Court looked to the structure
of the two statutes to determine whether the statutes were in conflict.  If so,
the Court then asks whether the federal statute preempts the state statute.200
This Note previously determined that state officials, due to the Michigan pen-
sion clause, may not take any action to reduce public workers’ pensions.201  It
must be determined, then, whether the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with this
reading of the pension clause.
It is clear that municipal bankruptcy is constrained by the Tenth Amend-
ment and the principles of federalism.202  The Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s ability to enact municipal bank-
ruptcy legislation and upheld Chapter 9 on the back of its protections for
federalism only two years after a previous version of the municipal bank-
ruptcy statute had been struck down on federalism grounds.203  However,
federal bankruptcy law has the power to preempt similar state law regarding
the rights of debtors and creditors if it can do so without violating principles
of federalism: “[S]tate law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’
This includes state law dealing with insolvency, debtors, and the rights of
creditors.”204  When determining if state law has been preempted, a court
must start “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”205
Perhaps it is not surprising then that Congress has chosen to enact a
municipal bankruptcy statute that is deferential to, and which in many places
incorporates, state law.  The two sovereigns, state and federal, must work
together in Chapter 9 without undermining the sovereignty of one
199 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
200 Id. at 644.
201 See supra notes 161–79 and accompanying text.
202 See In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“Bankruptcy courts should review chapter 9 petitions with a jaded eye.  Principles of dual
sovereignty, deeply embedded in the fabric of this nation and commemorated in the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, severely curtail the power of bank-
ruptcy courts to compel municipalities to act once a petition is approved.”); supra Part II.
203 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 543 (1936), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 16,
1937, 50 Stat. 653, as recognized in In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 18 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2012).
204 Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: An Uncertain
Boundary Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 391–92 (2007) (foot-
note omitted).
205 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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another.206  In order to effectuate such a system, Congress has shaped Chap-
ter 9 in a way that does not violate the sovereignty of states.  Many protections
for state sovereignty are written into the Code, and they often incorporate
state law.  For example, 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) requires that the debtor not be
prohibited by law from taking the action outlined in the plan, including by
state law.207  In general, the Bankruptcy Code does not define property
rights, but instead takes such rights as provided in non-bankruptcy law.208
The deferential and sovereignty-protecting system that Congress has
established indicates that the pension clause is not preempted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code, but rather has been incorporated by it.  Commentators have
argued for the incorporation of economic rights from state law by the Bank-
ruptcy Code in other areas, such as the duty to negotiate under certain terms
with collective bargaining entities.209  Whether breach of contract has
occurred is determined according to state law even when in bankruptcy,210 as
is whether a domestic support payment will be treated as support or distribu-
tion of property.211  The Bankruptcy Code looks to state law constantly to
characterize property, determine its owner, and serve as the starting point for
the bankruptcy estate.
It is reasonable, therefore, to think that given its respect for state law,
Chapter 9 would also look to state law and accept that pension obligations
cannot be reduced because they present a special form of property in Michi-
gan.  The protection of state law in § 943(b) requires that bankruptcy law
remain respectful of the limits imposed by state law and the dual sovereignty
system.212  Most debts can be adjusted in bankruptcy because the contracts
clause of the Michigan Constitution and state statutes that protect property
and contract rights step aside of their own volition in times of financial emer-
gency.213  In this way, the discharge of debts in municipal bankruptcy is not a
violation of state law—it is a manifestation of the state and its municipality
utilizing a power offered by the federal government to adjust its debts, in
206 In re Stockton, 478 B.R. at 18 (“The Supreme Court . . . reason[ed] that [the 1937
Act] was a cooperative enterprise by state and federal sovereigns that was carefully drawn
so as not to infringe state sovereignty [and] emphasized that a state ‘retains control of its
fiscal affairs’ and that no ‘control or jurisdiction over that property and those revenues of
the petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is conferred’ on the
federal court.” (citations omitted)).
207 “The court shall confirm the plan if . . . the debtor is not prohibited by law from
taking any action necessary to carry out the plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012).
208 Zayler v. United States (In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc.), 468 F.3d 248, 255 (5th
Cir. 2006).
209 “Fairly read, congressional interpretation of the 1976 municipal bankruptcy revision
requires maintenance of bargained-for contract terms, in accord with state law, before and
after court-approved rejection.”  Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for Negotiated
Modification of Public Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 319 (1985).
210 11 U.S.C. § 365(c).
211 Id. § 523(a)(5), (15).
212 Id. § 943(b).
213 See supra notes 152–60 and accompanying text.
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accordance with state law.  However, if this Note’s interpretation of the pen-
sion clause is correct, the pension clause does not step aside in the same way,
and public pension debts cannot be discharged in Michigan unless the pen-
sion clause is preempted.  It is unclear whether, given the protections of fed-
eralism and the Tenth Amendment, the federal government would be able to
preempt the pension clause through Chapter 9 if it chose to—but as has
hopefully been demonstrated at this point, the fairest reading of the Code is
that such a state protection is incorporated into the definitions of property
and what is dischargeable in the Code.
What sort of plan, then, may the municipality propose?  It could be
argued that there is no limit on what a debtor-filed plan may contain.  This
sort of argument would look similar to the one made earlier in this Part as to
why authorization of the filing is permissible under the pension clause: it is
only an intermediate step to the discharge of debts, and because there are
additional steps that must be taken before pensions can be reduced, there is
no limitation.214  Such logic, however, is much less compelling in the context
of filing a plan than it is when examining whether filing the case is impermis-
sible.  Two facets of the Bankruptcy Code demand that filing such a plan be
considered to violate state law.  First is the total exclusivity provision of
§ 941.215  Because the debtor is the only entity that may file a plan in Chapter
9, it has total control over what the provisions of that plan are.  This means
that the debtor has the ability to shape the plan to protect pensions, and if it
does not, such a plan would reflect a conscious choice by the municipality to
undermine the state constitution.  The second facet of the Code leading to
the conclusion that Detroit may not file a plan that would reduce pensions is
the bankruptcy judge’s lack of discretion when confirming the plan.216  If the
plan proposed by the debtor conforms to § 943’s requirements, the bank-
ruptcy judge has no choice but to confirm it.217  This means that the debtor
municipality has incredible control over the terms of the plan: within the
limits of § 943, it can shape the plan however it wants without any other
entity having a discretionary check on the process.  Because filing a plan is
the last discretionary step for a municipality in the plan confirmation pro-
cess, such a plan cannot be filed by a municipality without violating state
law.218  Detroit may not file a plan that attempts to impair pensions.
214 See supra notes 180–86 and accompanying text.
215 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s
debts.” (emphasis added)).
216 “The court shall confirm the plan if . . . .” Id. § 943(b) (emphasis added) (listing
the provisions with which the debtor’s plan must comply, but stating that if those condi-
tions are met, the plan must be approved).
217 Id.
218 Were such a plan to be filed, a bankruptcy court that accepts the interpretations of
the Code and pension clause set forth in this Note would have to deny such a plan anyway.
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CONCLUSION
  Municipal bankruptcy attempts to give much-needed relief to struggling
municipalities that may have very few other options to get out from under a
self-reinforcing cycle of falling revenues and rising debts.  However, if the
American system of dual sovereignty is to survive the bankruptcies of large
and once-prosperous cities like Detroit, courts will need to give real weight to
state law in the bankruptcy context.  This Note provides a framework that
would allow the bankruptcy system to respect state definitions of property
and limit what can legally be done to change property interests while simulta-
neously equipping municipalities with the tools they need to rehabilitate
their finances.
While this Note’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and pension
clause of the Michigan Constitution would prevent Detroit from reducing
vested pension obligations, the situation may not be as dire as one might
assume.  Under the proposed interpretation, the City of Detroit may still
reduce or eliminate other obligations, such as non-vested pension obliga-
tions, medical benefits of its workforce and retirees, and other debts that do
not receive special, constitutional protection.  While the city’s financial situa-
tion is undeniably distressed, the promise of bankruptcy relief provides at
least a partial road to financial redemption.  While the bankruptcy court has
now entered judgment on the eligibility of Detroit to be a debtor, it seems
highly likely that the question will be considered by a higher court before the
matter is fully put to rest.
